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WHAT DOES VALUE MEAN AND HOW IS IT CREATED, 
MAINTAINED AND DESTROYED? 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we suggest that 'value' has a different meaning for different stakeholders and 
that if the firm operates in line with investor interests, it acts as both customer and supplier 
and its motivations will reflect these roles. We then consider internal activities that reflect 
these motivations. Other activities maintain the firm, and some destroy value. Implications 
for the RBV are explored.  
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WHAT DOES VALUE MEAN AND HOW IS IT CREATED, 
MAINTAINED AND DESTROYED? 
 
"The primary objective of the strategic management field in general and of the RBV in 
particular, is to explain firm profitability- and firm profitability is determined by the value 
captured by the firm." (Makadok and Coff, 2002:10).  
 
Although the "notion of value creation lies at the heart of organisational success and 
survival" (Lepak, Smith and Taylor 2002:320), there is still some confusion surrounding 
various aspects of what is meant by value and the process of value creation. In this paper we 
focus specifically on the following questions: what does value mean to different 
stakeholders? How is value created? And how are value creation processes sustained over 
time? We also address the issue of value destruction, which we believe is central to any 
exploration of the processes of value creation within firms. 
Our answers to these questions are informed by recent contributions to the Academy of 
Management Review and the British Journal of Management in which scholars have argued 
that despite being central to our understanding of competitive advantage we were still unclear 
about what value means (Barney, 2001; Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000, 2001; Makadok, 
2001a; Makadok and Coff, 2002; Priem, 2001; Priem and Butler, 2001a, b). In this paper we 
propose that value means different things to different stakeholders of the firm, specifically its 
customers, suppliers, employees and investors. We begin by clarifying the terms we use, 
making a distinction in particular between use value and exchange value, and between value 
creation and value capture. We then consider the firm itself in the role of customer and 
supplier, and distinguish activities inside the firm that reflect the firm's motivations when 
these separate roles are performed. Five types of activity can be identified. Two types are 
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involved with the process of value creation: one is concerned with the capture of exchange 
value from customers, and another with the capture of use value from suppliers. Two other 
activity types are directed at the maintenance of the firm, and the maintenance of its capital 
stock. The final category is activity that destroys value. We conclude with some suggestions 
as to how these different activities can be identified, and we explain some of the difficulties 
inherent to recognising sources of sustainable competitive advantage, i.e. resource-based 
view 'resources', within these categories. 
 
USE VALUE AND EXCHANGE VALUE 
 
Before we embark on an explanation of our approach, we need to be clear about our 
use of value terminology in the following argument. This is necessary as it is "rather 
commonplace in the existing resource-based view of the firm (RBV) literature for authors to 
use the term value or even value creation to mean what Bowman and Ambrosini call 
'captured value' or 'value capture'"(Makadok and Coff, 2002: 11).  
Use values (UV) are properties of products and services that provide utility. Inputs 
into the productive process take the form of inert use values e.g. components such as flour or 
steel, and human inputs. Inert inputs are use value in the form of products, and human inputs 
are use values in the form of performed services or activities. The peculiarity of human inputs 
is their ability to create new use values.  
 Exchange value (EV) is a monetary amount exchanged between the firm and its 
customers or suppliers when use values are traded. Use values are converted into exchange 
value when they are sold in factor markets or product markets. Firms are established to 
generate a profit flow for investors. Profit is exchange value retained within the firm, which 
may be re-invested or passed on to these equity owners.  
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 The firm contains the processes of use value creation (see figure 1). Within the firm 
inputted inert use values like components, ingredients, data etc (UVi in Figure 1) are 
transformed into products and services by employees (UVp in figure 1). Inert inputs 
contribute their fixed and usually known use values to the productive process. These inputs 
are use values; they have useful, primarily physical properties, but this stock of use values 
cannot self-expand. They cannot of their own volition create more value than they embody. 
These inputs cannot, therefore be the source of any additional use value, and subsequently of 
any additional exchange value accruing to the firm unless they have been transformed in 
some way (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000). In summary then, inert inputs have use value, but 
they cannot create use value.  
Human inputs are different (UVh in figure 1). They are capable of creating new use 
values that generate a revenue stream. Employees working with inert inputs create new value 
(Lado and Wilson, 1994; Wright, McMahan and McWilliams, 1994). 
UVh also includes the enhanced productive capabilities of the employed labour that 
results from experience and learning (Argote, 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Senge, 
1990). Just as the use value of labour in action is its ability to create new use values, where 
human capital is created this is manifested in the enhanced use value creating capability of 
the employed labour. This category would include informal networks, and valuable aspects of 
organisational culture that are embodied and embedded in the workforce (Barney 1986; 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Here we need to recognise that 
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human capital may take the form of teams (Grant, 2000), and 'communities of practice' (Lave 
and Wenger, 1991) and that individuals and teams are likely to be more productive when they 
are combined with other complementary organisational assets. In all but the simplest firms 
there will be synergies between employees combined in networks, teams, functions etc. In 
other words this definition of human input encompasses the notion of social capital (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998; Pennings, Lee and Wittelostuijn, 1998).  
The fixed assets of the firm like buildings and machinery are enduring inert use values 
(UVc in figure 1). Once a firm is a going concern additional forms of capital can be created. 
This would include certain aspects of relational capital like brand awareness, reputation, trust 
(Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Brooking ,1997, Edvinsson and Malone, 1997, Sveiby, 1997). It 
would also comprise internally created inert resources such special equipment or software. 
These can be regarded as intermediate use values created inside the firm to improve the 
efficiency and /or effectiveness of the use value creation processes. These may well be RBV 
resources, that is resources that are simultaneously valuable, rare, non imitable and non-
substitutable and that hence can be sources of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
The essential difference between intermediate use values (brands, systems) and the 
development of human capital described are that the former exist separate from the 
individuals that may work with them, whereas the latter developments in human capital are 
embodied in individuals and groups. These may take the form of tacit knowledge and tacit 
routines, knowledge assets that are attached to the knower (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Nonaka, 1991; Polanyi 1962). Clearly if tacit routines were to be made explicit, codified in 
some way, then this knowledge would exist in a form separate from the individuals or groups. 
In which case it could become an intermediate use value, able to be deployed into other parts 
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of the firm. In terms of the RBV organisational and human capital are use values that have 
been 'built rather than bought' (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).  
To simplify the exposition we label all these separable categories of enduring capital 
UVc in Figure 1. However, distinctions between these categories of use value capital are 
important when we consider issues of competitor imitation of the firm's assets. Generally 
within RBV argumentation bought assets like machinery, land, buildings are rarely RBV 
resources as near identical assets can often be procured by competitors (Conner 1994; Quinn, 
1992). On the other hand, internally created or 'built' assets like special systems, adapted 
machinery, brands etc. may well fulfil the criteria for a resource, they are more likely to pass 
the VRIN tests, be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and imperfectly substitutable (Barney, 
1991, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
We must however stress that we are making a clear distinction between inert inputs 
and human inputs. If managers are able to derive new ways of deploying inert inputs to create 
new forms of value, then it must be highlighted that this process of value creation cannot be 
attributed to the inert resources re-deployed. These use values may have greater utility in new 
deployments, but the act of value creation, the insight to spot the new deployment was a 
product of human inputs. The use values of the inert inputs are fixed, any change in their 
utility can only be effected by people. This argument is not novel in the sense that it 
emphasises that people is that matters most in organisations (Pfeffer, 1995; Pfeffer and 
Veiga, 1999). It is also in line with Penrose (1959) where she argues that "it is never the 
resources themselves that are the inputs to the production process, only the services that the 
resources can render" (1959:25). People determine how a particular input will perform a 
'service' in a productive process not the inert input itself (Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
We now address the question: what does value mean to different stakeholders in the 
firm? 
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WHAT DOES 'VALUE' MEAN TO STAKEHOLDERS? 
 
There are four primary stakeholders in the firm: its customers, the suppliers of inert 
inputs, the suppliers of human inputs, and the owners of the firm (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 
1984) and in what follows we argue that value has a different meaning for each of these 
stakeholder groups.  
While the terms we employ can be associated with the transactions costs and agency 
literature we would like to comment that when forming our propositions we have employed 
the term optimise to reflect the fact that it is likely that stakeholders will seek to optimise 
relationships over time, rather than attempt to maximise or 'gouge' other parties for short-term 
gains. So although we believe the underlying stakeholder motivations are properly reflected 
in the following propositions, we would not assume entirely opportunistic behaviour on their 
behalf, particularly if there is a perceived need to maintain relationships over time.  
 
What Does 'Value' Mean to Customers? 
To the customer value can be argued to mean consumer surplus, or colloquially 'value 
for money'. This is a subjective judgement of the use value of the supplied product or service, 
and the price charged for it, its exchange value. In making these judgements customers factor 
in their knowledge and evaluations of competing product offers. If we assume the customer is 
interested in optimising 'value for money', then we could state that the customer would strive 
to optimise the ratio of use value acquired for exchange value paid (price): 
 
Proposition 1 Customers aim to optimise the ratio of Use Value acquired for the 
Exchange Value Paid 
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We have labelled these EVp and UVp as they refer to produced outputs of the value 
creation process. Use value, being a subjective assessment, cannot be compared directly with 
any exchange value amount. Consequently the relationship between UVp and EVp cannot be 
expressed as an algebraic fraction (UVp/EVp) as these two quanta are not commensurable. 
One can however assume that consumers would aim to optimise the amount of use value 
acquired for a given sum of exchange value, where amount could refer to a qualitative or a 
quantitative improvement. UVp then can be understood as reservation price. If the customers 
choose to attach a monetary estimate to the perceived use value of the product ($UVp) then 
one can suggest that customers are interested in optimising the difference between $UVp and 
$EVp. This consumer surplus could be measured as: $UVp - $EVp. 
In the instance of a monopoly supplier, who is cognisant of the customers' valuation, 
and who can price discriminate, the price the customer actually pays will approach the price 
the customer is prepared to pay. There would then be no discernable difference between the 
customer's monetary expression of perceived use value ($UVp) and the price paid ($EVp) 
and hence no consumer surplus would result. In all other circumstances, the price paid will be 
less than the total monetary value perceived by the customer.  
 
What Does 'Value' Mean to Suppliers? 
Suppliers of inert inputs to the firm have a different view of value. They are not 
acquiring use values, rather they are providing them in return for exchange value. So value to 
the supplier is the inverse of value to the customer: 
 
Proposition 2 Suppliers aim to optimise the Exchange Value received for the Use 
Value supplied  
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In the case of a supplier of inert inputs the use value supplied is fixed. Moreover, as 
the point of creating use value is solely as a means of generating exchange value, the use 
value of the product to the supplier is probably close to zero (bakers have no personal use for 
the hundreds of loaves they bake). Thus it can be argued that supplier exchange value is 
increased where the price received for a fixed amount of use value is optimised (optimise 
EVi:UVi). 
Suppliers of human inputs, whether as employees or as service providers, have a 
different conception of value to that of the supplier of inert inputs to the firm. The use value 
they supply is their capacity to work. This capacity is the only source of new use value, 
because as we argued earlier the contribution of inert inputs is fixed at the point of sale. The 
use value of labour in action combines with inert inputs (UVi) and capital assets (UVc) to 
create new use values (UVp) (see Figure 1). 
We might expect the suppliers of human inputs to contract with the firm in the same 
way as suppliers of inert inputs, seeking to optimise the exchange value (EVh) they can 
capture for a given amount of use value, or work, supplied. This assumption of a calculative 
involvement with the firm (Etzioni, 1988) may only have limited validity. Great efforts are 
often made by both employees and firms (which presents itself to employees in the form of 
hired managers, co-workers, etc.) to shift the nature of the relationship away from this purely 
calculative involvement. Individual employees may prefer to view their working lives as 
something more than a simple exchange relationship, and firms may wish to have employees 
engage more fully with the firm, where they commit not just their hands, but their brains and 
their hearts too. This suggests that the firm necessarily has a much more complex relationship 
with these suppliers than it would have with suppliers of inert inputs.  
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What Does 'Value' Mean to Investors? 
 The owners of the firm again have a different notion of what value means. Investors 
supply capital, a monetary sum. This sum is invested on the assumption that more money will 
flow to the investor, that there will be a 'return' on this investment. The investor therefore 
provides exchange value, to capture more exchange value. The investor seeks to optimise 
return on the capital sum advanced (optimising EVr:EVi). 
 
Proposition 3 Investors aim to optimise the exchange value returned for the exchange 
value invested 
 
There are two primary ways of 'investing' in firm. One is to provide equity or risk 
capital, for a legal claim on the surpluses generated by the firm, which will vary as surpluses 
vary. The other is to provide debt capital for a fixed claim on these surpluses. In either case it 
is essential here to emphasise that the investor provides no use values as such to the firm, and 
acquires no use values from the firm. Investors supply a homogenous input: money. The use 
value of money is its role as a store of value, and its function as a medium of exchange. 
Money qua money cannot function as capital. The only way money can function as capital is 
if it is converted from its money form into specific, definite, concrete use values. Where 
investors supply cash for specific projects this conversion process is transparent. Where 
investors acquire stocks or shares there is no addition to the value creation process. What is 
being traded here is partial ownership of a value creating system that is the firm. Investors 
exchange cash for property rights, which then allow investors to capture a proportion of the 
exchange value the firm captures from customers. 
In summary we have argued that value means different things to different 
stakeholders. We have also established that, not only is there an obvious difference between 
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suppliers and customers as to their motivations when contracting with the firm, but also that 
within the category of suppliers there are three distinct stakeholder types who have particular 
motivations and relationships with the firm. Suppliers of inert use values have an 'arms 
length', primarily calculative involvement with the firm, whereas suppliers of human 
resources have a qualitatively more intense involvement, and investors have no use value 
involvement at all. 
 The question that needs now answering is: what does value mean to the firm? 
 
What Does 'Value' Mean to the Firm? 
 The firm as an economic actor and a legal entity is both a customer for use 
values and a supplier of use values. Thus we would expect the behaviour of the firm to reflect 
the motivations set out above for these two stakeholder groups. So in acting as a customer, 
the firm would seek to optimise the use value of inputs acquired, for the minimum exchange 
value given up to suppliers. As a customer the firm acts to optimise consumer surplus.  
As a supplier, we would expect the firm to aim to optimise the exchange value 
captured from customers for a given use value supplied. Firms must therefore differentiate 
their product offerings in ways, which are valued by the customer. Firms must deliver more 
consumer surplus than competitors. This can be achieved by either offering equivalent 
perceived use value at a lower price, superior use value at equivalent prices to competitors, or 
indeed a combination of these. The availability of close substitutes will reduce prices, and 
thereby increase consumer surplus, but this will reduce firm's ability to capture exchange 
value.  
The firm performs the roles of supplier and customer for an ultimate purpose: to 
return an expanding stream of exchange value to investors. In other words the firm is 
fundamentally a system for the continual expansion of exchange value provided by investors. 
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Therefore we are privileging the interests of the investor over those of other stakeholders. 
While probably debatable for some this is based on the assumption, that within a capitalist 
economy production is undertaken in the pursuit of profit. Firms that don't 'make' money go 
'out of business'.  
 
Proposition 4 Firms operate primarily in the interests of the investor, so value for the 
firm means retained and/or returnable exchange value 
 
The expected motivations therefore with respect to the roles of customer and supplier 
should be in line with the aims of the investor.  
We would expect that if the firm behaved as a customer and a supplier that the 
optimum exchange value would be captured from customers, the minimum exchange value 
passed back to suppliers, and thus the optimum profit returnable to the owners of the firm. 
Due to agency problems resulting from the divorce of ownership from control, information 
asymmetries, bounded rationality and so on firm behaviour towards customers and suppliers 
may not however result in the maximising of profits. 
 Building on the argument, and viewing the firm as a customer on the one hand and a 
supplier on the other, we can identify activities inside the firm that are involved in optimising 
exchange value capture from customers, and activities directed at optimising use value 
capture from suppliers. These activities combine to form the 'value creating' activities of the 
firm. 'Value' in this case being value from an investor perspective i.e. profit flow, the 
exchange value captured by the firm. 
In the next section, we explore these different types of activities involved in the 
process of value creation.  
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VALUE CREATING ACTIVITIES 
 
Having explored the issue of what value means to different stakeholders, we can now 
turn our attention to the question of how value is created. We have already established that 
inert inputs contribute a fixed and usually known quantity of use value to the productive 
process. To restate the argument, inert inputs have use value, they cannot self-expand the use 
value they possess or embody, and new use values can only be created by the human inputs 
into the process (UVh). Our argument also indicates that, in line with Priem and Butler 
(2001) and Barney (2001) exchange value is determined by exogenous factors. It is a function 
of perceived use value acquired and supplied. Moreover it shows that exchange value is only 
realized when a sale takes place. Use value is perceived by the customer at a point in time, it 
is assessed at the point of decision to purchase. The product at the time of sale has both an 
exchange value and a perceived use value. So, to reiterate there is no firm value creation i.e. 
profits, until a sale takes place.  
 There are two categories of activity that can have a positive impact on the flow of 
profits, and three that have a negative impact in the short term. We first explore activities that 
reflect the firm first as a supplier of new use values, and our second type of activities are 
associated with the firm as a customer of use values. Both these activities can be identified in 
March's (1991) terminology as knowledge exploitation. 
. 
Activities that Capture Exchange Value 
These activities are involved in the production and sale of products and services, and would 
include the primary activities of a value chain (Porter, 1985) i.e. inbound logistics, 
operations, outbound logistics, sales and service. These activities combine to make use values 
or provide services that produce a revenue stream to the firm. This activity reflects the firm's 
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motivation as a supplier and it aims to optimise the sum of exchange value captured for a 
given amount of use values supplied (optimising EVp:UVp). Hence, 
  
Proposition 5 Profit seeking firms will optimise the sum of exchange value captured 
for a given amount of use value supplied 
 
These activities can only be identified in retrospect as unless the activity leads to a sale i.e. it 
ultimately results in the capture of exchange value from customers, the activity cannot be 
judged to be productive.  
 
Activities that Capture Use Value 
These activities are directed at the capture of use value from input suppliers i.e. the aim of 
this activity is to optimise the flow of use values into the firm for a given amount of exchange 
value given up. So these activities reflect the firm's motives as a customer. 
 These value capture activities would include procurement, supervision (to capture 
human use value inputs), as well as activities designed to increase production efficiencies, 
like process engineering. So these activities aim to optimise the inert use values and the 
human inputs procured: optimise UVi:EVi and UVh:EVh. Hence, 
 
Proposition 6 Profit seeking firms will optimise the amount of use value captured for 
a given sum of exchange value 
 
The effect of these activities is therefore to moderate the cost flows incurred by all other 
activities. For instance artful procurement can result in a cost advantage where the firm pays 
less than rivals for equivalent use value inputs, the activity of 'resource picking' (Makadok, 
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2001b). One should note that the acquired inert inputs are only RBV resources because of the 
artful way they have been procured. A resource created by 'picking' delivers a greater use 
value:exchange value ratio than a rival firm's inputs. Also excessive zeal in performing value 
capture activities can be ultimately counter-productive. For example, if planned maintenance 
schedules are ignored, or if safety is compromised. 
 We have explained so far that the firm therefore contains the processes of use value 
creation. The objective of these processes is exchange value capture which provides an 
expanding stream profits to the shareholders. The flow of profits is the difference between the 
flow of revenues (EVp) and the flow of costs (EVi, EVh). Whether one treats the returns to 
the owners (EVr) as a surplus or as an input cost is the crux of a debate between neo-classical 
economists and those of a more classical persuasion. As this point does not affect the thrust 
of our argument we shall note it but not engage with it here. 
 We now turn our attention to activities that create new capital. These activities can be 
described as exploratory activities (March 1991), they are about creating and building the 
stock of capital. 
 
Capital Stock Creating Activities 
These activities have to be funded out of current streams of exchange value captured 
from customers, and would include market research, R & D, and training. They help to 
preserve the capital stock of the firm by, for example, ensuring that the firm adapts to 
changes in the environment, and they hopefully extend the capital stock through the creation 
of new resources. 
These activities are intended to generate future streams of firm value. The dilemma is 
that this activity incurs costs today for unknowable future benefits. Hence in the short term 
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these activities reduce the exchange value retained by the firm. However they help to 
preserve and expand the stock of human and organisational capital into the future .  
These activities can produce intermediate use values i.e. use value created by the firm for its 
own usage and not for exchange, like systems, new product concepts etc. that can turn into 
built RBV resources if they are unique, valuable, non-imitable and non-substitutable. They 
preserve the capital stock by ensuring that the activities are updated and refreshed in line with 
changes in the firm's environment, and they can expand the firm's capital with the 
introduction of new value creating activities. These may be discrete and deliberately managed 
support activities like R&D, technology development, and training (Porter, 1985) or they 
could be co-produced with ongoing value creating activities. Co-produced activities would 
include learning from reflection or from interactions with clients (Argote 1999; Argyris, 
1970; 1990). Some capital creation activities may be undertaken without official sanction 
from management as individuals experiment with new ideas and approaches to their tasks. 
Dynamic capabilities directed at the creation of future resources are capital stock creation 
activities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Makadok, 2001b; Teece et al, 1997). However, these 
activities are typically vulnerable to short-term pressures to trim costs as the value created by 
them can only be assessed ex post. Here the proportion of revenues used to fund these 
essentially speculative investments would be returned to investors in the form of dividends. 
Hence,  
 
Proposition 7 Expenditure on capital stock creating activities is vulnerable to short-
term pressures to cut costs 
 
 Clearly, given that the future behaviour of the market is unknown, persisting with 
these cost creating activities is to some extent an act of faith. Managers that choose to devote 
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expenditure to these activities do so on the assumption that they will generate future profits, 
and that these profit streams will either add to the current volume of profits, or replace them. 
Whether these costs can be justified to investors is an empirical question. Some may prefer to 
have the cash to invest elsewhere, rather than assume that this management team can organise 
the creation of future profitable schemes within the constraints of this particular firm. 
 
Firm Maintenance Activities 
These activities are those necessary for the maintenance of the firm in a particular 
social context, including infrastructure activities (Porter, 1985) like finance, company 
secretariat, health and safety, legal etc. These activities are necessary to conduct business, but 
they do not contribute to present or future profit streams. Efforts will be made to perform 
these necessary activities at lowest cost. There are related expenditures, which are not 
activities, but they have a similar impact. These expenditures include tax, social welfare 
payments, training levies etc. Some stakeholders' models of the firm include a catch-all 
'society' stakeholder category (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995). These expenses are 
necessary and it could be argued that maintenance activities, and maintenance expenses are a 
response to societal pressures, but profit seeking firms will act to reduce the impact of these 
expenses. Hence, 
 
Proposition 8 Profit seeking firms will seek to minimise expenditure on maintenance 
activities 
 
Value Destroying Activity 
There are in all firms activities that destroy current value. They do not contribute to 
the capture of exchange value or the capture of use values.  These activities also do not have 
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any link to future profitability nor are they necessary maintenance activities. These 
inefficiencies are likely to exist because of poor management. They do not add to revenues, 
nor do they help reduce costs, therefore the expenses they incur actually destroy shareholder 
value. These are liabilities in the true sense of the word. Hence,  
 
Proposition 9 Profit seeking firms will seek to eliminate value destroying activities 
 
We need to point out that although value-destroying activity is a theoretically credible 
construct, it is unlikely to be present in an obvious or discrete form. If it were we would 
expect that these costs would be identified and steps would be taken to eliminate them. 
Value-creating activities are likely to contain some unproductive elements intertwined with 
their valuable elements. These elements would not necessarily present themselves in 
straightforward ways, and it may be difficult to eliminate the unproductive elements without 
having a detrimental impact on the productive aspects of the activity. 
 In Table 1 we have set out a simplified numerical example to illustrate the approach.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Reading from the left in column 1 we have 'Total $UV', the amount the firm's 
customer would be prepared to pay for the product, its 'reservation price'. In column 2 we 
have the amount actually paid, which is the exchange value captured by the firm. Subtracting 
column 2 from column 1 gives us the consumer surplus captured by the customer (column 3). 
Column 4 is the sum paid to suppliers of inert inputs into the production process. As we have 
argued that all value is created by human inputs, by subtracting column 4 from column 2 we 
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can see the exchange value created by organisational members, column 5. Then by 
subtracting the wage costs of column 6 we can arrive at the total exchange value captured by 
the firm. This sum could be paid out to investors in the form of fixed interest on debt capital, 
or dividends on equity capital or some or all of it might be retained to fund capital creating 
activities. 
In the first row of Table 1 we depict the situation of the 'average' firm in the industry, 
which retains a surplus of $30. In the next row we assume a firm that is endowed with use 
value capture resources (i.e. the firm excels in its role as a customer). The advantage of these 
resources is to lower the relative procurement costs of bought in human and inert inputs. Here 
the firm's employees create more value than the average firm ($70) but they capture less 
value in the form of wages ($20). These resources may consist of skilled procurement 
activities, more efficient processes, or lower maintenance costs.  
In the third row we have the case of the firm endowed with exchange value capture 
resources (i.e. the firm excels in its role as a supplier). Here, due to product excellence or 
skilled negotiation skills the firm is able to generate a greater perception of the use value of 
the product and can capture more value from customers than the average firm ($90 rather 
than $80). So the value captured from customers that has been created inside the firm 
increases to $70. Moreover because inert and human input costs are the same as in the 
average firm i.e. these skilled employees are unable to bargain up their share of the value they 
create, the firm retains more exchange value than the average firm ($40 > $30).  
In the next row we have the case where the firm incurs significant costs due to poor 
control of input costs. The firm uses too many inputs for the same output: it is unproductive 
and relatively inefficient. Hence it captures less exchange value than the average firm. 
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In the last row is the case of a firm endowed with exchange value-capturing resources, 
but it also suffers from an excess of unproductive activities, the result being below average 
value being retained by the firm ($20 < $30).  
In these examples we have taken value creation to mean, as far as the firm is 
concerned, exchange value captured by the firm. As previously mentioned this reflects the 
argument that economic activity is primarily instigated and motivated by the pursuit of 
profits. However, the rows could be reworked to reflect a stakeholder view where value 
created would be the column 1 version i.e. exchange value + consumer surplus. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Identifying RBV resources 
The argument we have developed above has some implications for the resource-based 
view, particularly in relation to what 'valuable' means in the 'VRIN' criteria (Barney, 2001, 
Priem and Butler, 2001a, b) and in terms of identifying these valuable resources. There are 
differing positions within the RBV with regard to the extent to which resources can be 
understood. Resources that are socially complex and causally ambiguous can be argued to be 
difficult to understand (Reed and DeFillipi, 1990; Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999). It is 
however possible for resources to be internally known about, and for them to be deliberately 
managed and nurtured while  still being causally ambiguous from a rival firm's perspective 
(Mosakowski, 1997; Wilcox King and Zeithaml, 2001). What is certain is that some 
resources may emerge through un-managed processes; they are the products more of luck 
than managerial judgement. This should not however prevent the development of an ex-post 
understanding of the resource. 
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The more fine-grained definitions of value we have set out can help us understand 
what exactly we mean by valuable resources. There are however further issues that need to be 
addressed before we can be confident that we have an operationalizable approach to valuing 
resources. In particular, we need to consider how value-creating activities can be empirically 
distinguished within the complexities of a firm. Barney and Arikan (2002) can be seen to give 
us some indications about how this can be done. Indeed, when they argue that “to the extent 
that a firm's attributes enable it to develop and implement strategies that have the effect of 
reducing a firm's net costs or increasing its net revenues compared to what would have been 
the case if those attributes had not been used, those attributes can be thought of as strategic 
resources” (Barney and Arikan, 2002:143), they suggest that resources can be identified 
through a process of internal benchmarking. Resources defined in this way are valuable in 
that they contribute to a stream of profits. They do this either through lowering net input costs 
i.e. the cost of the resource is outweighed by the cost reductions it can effect, or increasing 
net revenues i.e. the revenue increment the resource generates more than offsets the cost of 
the resource. These definitions suggest that all the exchange value creating and use value 
capturing activities we have explained would be classed as VRIN resources.  
However, even so the presence of these profit-generating activities may not result in 
the firm showing an overall profit due to the presence of maintenance costs, capital creation 
costs and unproductive activities. The collective costs of these activities can overwhelm the 
contributions from value creating activities. As highlighted by Peteraf (1993) to be valuable a 
resource must not only generate rents but ex-ante limits to competition need also to be 
present in order to prevent costs from offsetting the rents. 
Later in their chapter, Barney and Arikan (2002) consider the problems of 
parameterizing the RBV. They qualify their initial definition of valuable strategic resources 
thus: “firm attributes are intrinsically neither good nor bad, neither valuable nor non-valuable. 
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Rather, their value depends entirely on their ability to enable firms to conceive of and 
implement strategies that generate superior performance. These observations suggest that 
resource-based explanations of superior performance cannot be developed independently of 
understanding the market and competitive context within which a firm operates” (2002:144). 
It is clear here that 'superior' performance does not mean an improvement on the 
firm's past performance (as indicated by their earlier definition), but superior to competing 
firms. We take up the challenge of operationalizing the RBV by drawing on both the internal 
and external benchmarking processes indicated by Barney and Arikan (2002).  
 
Benchmarking Activities 
To summarise, valuable resources are valuable to the firm, not to the resource owner 
or supplier. From proposition 4 we argue that firm value is equivalent to value from the 
investor's perspective. Thus valuable resources are valuable if they contribute to a profit 
stream, which the investor has property rights over i.e. where the revenues from the activity 
exceed the costs of the activity. Where the supplier of inputs to the productive process is able 
to fully appropriate the revenues the activity generates, revenues are matched by the costs of 
the activity, and no profits accrue to the firm.  
On this basis value creating and capturing activities can be benchmarked internally 
i.e. the most efficient production unit, the most effective sales team. They can also be 
benchmarked externally against activities in comparable, usually competing, firms. This 
benchmarking may reveal that some of these activities may be candidates for RBV resources, 
if they are involved in helping the firm achieve product differentiation or lower unit costs and 
if they are difficult to replicate (Barney, 1991; Castanias and Helfat, 1991).  
Benchmarking may also reveal activities that are necessary for the production of use 
values, but they are not special or particular to this firm. These activities may be performed 
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commonly across a set of competing firms, but they may be special to the industry, where the 
industry is the collective of competing firms. These could be considered to be industry 
resources, and if firms within this industry gain a profit premium compared to other firms in 
other industries then it would be attributable to these industry resources. These resources 
could be regarded as barriers to entry to the industry. So an industry resource would be an 
activity that generates a per unit profit at an industry average rate. Where a particular firm's 
activities deliver a profit stream above this average rate then we could regard these activities 
as RBV resources. 
There is a third category of activity, those that are nevertheless necessary for the 
production and delivery of use values, but these are generic i.e. they are not special to the 
firm or the industry. For example, the transport of finished goods to the customer might be 
such a generic activity. Generic activities may therefore be prime candidates for outsourcing. 
It would therefore seem that benchmarking against competitors would reveal that 
some activities are better than those in competing firms. But are they RBV resources? 
Though these activities are relatively excellent, their ability to positively impact on profit 
flows may be moderated by the presence of relatively inferior, say, sales activity. Can a firm 
only possess resources if it earns super-normal profits? Or might there be rent-generating 
resources that are present in firms producing average or indeed below average profits? Our 
view would be that resources may exist in firms earning average or below industry average 
profits if their profit impact is overwhelmed by the costs of maintenance and unproductive 
activities. 
To empirically identify value creating resources it is necessary to identify the costs of 
the activity and compare these to the incremental revenues the activity generates. The costs of 
the activity are probably fairly easy to identify, but it is probably very difficult to allocate a 
portion of a revenue stream to a particular activity. However, it may be more feasible to 
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identify value capture resources as it is probably more obvious the effect of removing the 
activity would have on cost flows. 
If we return to Barney and Arikan's (2002) first quote above this may give us a 
suggestion about how to empirically identify resources. If we can identify the impact on 
profits if the activity was subtracted, withdrawn from the production process, we can identify 
its contribution. For example, in the case of a sales person it is fairly straightforward to 
identify their contribution (volume of sales generated, less the costs of putting the sales 
person in the field). We could then compare productivity across sales people within the firm. 
This may be perceived to be 'fair' as long as like was being compared with like i.e. all sales 
staff had the same products to sell, to similar markets etc.  
Comparing sales effectiveness across a group of competing firms is, however, more 
difficult because more variables are introduced. Products may differ, some firms may have 
stronger brands, prices may vary etc. Like for like comparisons are unlikely to be feasible. 
Once we move beyond the relatively clear-cut case of evaluating sales activity things 
become much more complicated. How can we apportion parts of a revenue stream to 
activities involved in production or design? The 'subtraction' approach becomes inoperable 
where products can only be considered as a gestalt. For example, how much revenue should 
we attribute to the people who put the wheels on the cars? What is possible is to continue the 
internal benchmarking process, but only if we focus on relative costs, not revenues. It is 
possible to estimate the relative efficiency of internal activities, because this does not involve 
any arbitrary allocation of revenues. As argued above this would suggest that it is probably 
more straightforward to identify cost saving resources, rather than revenue-generating 
resources. Consequently, we should not be surprised if most managers concentrate their 
attention on cost reduction activities that have measurable results. 
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An alternative approach to resource identification would be to interrogate every 
activity in the organisation against the different types of activity we have set out. The 
following questions could be asked of each activity: 
1) Does it contribute to current sales? 
2) Does it help reduce current costs?  
3) Does it help create future sales, or lower future costs?  
4) Is it essential for the maintenance of the firm in this social context?  
If an activity exists, but it cannot be judged to contribute to any of the four categories 
tested above, then we must conclude, by a process of elimination, that this is an unproductive 
or value destroying activity. 
As explained earlier activities that are directed at the creation of future resources 
could best be regarded as dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece et al, 
1997). Where firms have been able to minimise the costs of firm maintenance activity they 
could be considered to have created cost reducing resources. Firms that have been able to 
develop systems or cultures that lead to below average wastage on unproductive activity 
could be regarded as having dynamic capabilities that create cost saving resources. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper after arguing that 'value' has a different meaning for different stakeholders, we 
have explained that if the firm operates in line with investor interests, in dealing with external 
stakeholders the firm itself acts as both customer and supplier, and its motivations will reflect 
these different roles. We have also argued that there is only one source of new value creation 
within the firm: human capital. Then we proposed that five separate types of activity can be 
discerned within a firm. The two value creating types reflect the firm's role as supplier and 
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customer. There are activities that are undertaken with the aim of optimising the capture of 
exchange value from customers, and there are others that aim to optimise the capture use 
values from suppliers. The three other categories reduce current investor returns due to their 
impact on costs combining with no compensating positive impact on the current revenue 
stream. We have suggested firm attitudes to the five types of activity if we assume the firm 
operates in the primary interests of investors. 
Finally, we explored some problems in operationalizing the RBV, particularly the problem of 
identifying resources. We concluded with some practical suggestions for identifying 
resources. 
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FIGURE 1 
Use Values and Exchange Values in the Value Creation Process 
Legend 
UVi: use values of inert inputs 
UVh: use values supplied by human inputs 
UVc: use values of enduring capital 
UVp: new use values created 
EVi: exchange value received by suppliers of inert inputs 
EVr: exchange value returned to investors 
EVh: exchange value received by suppliers of human inputs 
EVp: exchange value paid by customers 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Firm  
Status 
Reservation 
 Price 
$UVp 
Revenues 
EVp 
Consumer  
Surplus 
$UV – 
EVp  
(1-2) 
Cost of Inert 
Inputs 
EVi 
Value 
Created  
by Human  
Input 
EVp – Evi 
(2-4) 
Value 
Captured 
 by Human 
Input 
EVh 
Value 
Captured 
 by 
Investors 
EVr 
(5-6) 
Average  
Firm 
100 80 20 20 60 30 30 
Firm well 
endowed with 
resources for 
UV Capture 
100 80 20 10 70 20 50 
Firm well 
endowed with 
resources for 
EV Capture 
120 90 30 20 70 30 40 
Firm well 
endowed with 
unproductive 
Activities 
100 80 20 30 50 40 10 
Firm well 
endowed with 
EV resources 
but 
unproductive 
120 90 30 30 60 40 20 
 
TABLE 1:  
Examples of Resource Endowed Firms 
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